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replacing a large percentage of pre-retirement earnings. Most private sector workers
don’t have a pension plan and their retirement incomes are often a fraction of what
public sector workers receive.
The unfairness of Canada’s private retirement saving system rests in rules that limit
annual contributions to retirement savings vehicles; unnecessarily tie pension saving
to employment and employment income; restrict the kinds of income that can be
used for retirement saving; and inhibit creation of the kind of large, pooled pension
arrangements in the private sector that work well for public sector workers. This
paper shows how these rules prejudice private sector workers’ ability to save for
retirement and how they can be fixed. 
Canadian tax rules purport to offer equal access to deferred-income retirement
saving. In practice, they do not. Uniform, target retirement savings limits must be
adopted so that all Canadians will have the same opportunity to save for retirement.
The author recommends replacing current contribution limits with a more equitable
lump-sum accumulation target of $1 million – or more – as a preferred option.
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W
ith its Byzantine complexity
and jurisdictional overlap,
Canadian pension regulation
makes it difficult for many workers to
save enough for retirement. Access to
retirement saving room is inequitably
distributed between public and private
sector workers. 
Private sector workers cannot join the kind of multi-
employer pension arrangements that, in the public
sector, deliver good pensions to large numbers of
workers with low administrative and agency costs.
This paper offers some practical approaches to
making Canada’s private retirement saving system
work – for everyone. 
This paper does not suggest that public sector
pension benefits should be reduced. Rather, it argues
for uniform retirement saving limits that apply to
everyone equally. Along with increased flexibility to
establish multi-sponsor and self-funded arrange-
ments, this will do much to address the unfairness of
Canada’s current rules for private retirement saving,
resulting in better pensions for more Canadians. 
Consider how Canada’s private retirement savings
system works for two couples: 
￿ Angie and Brad have public sector careers. 
￿ Courtney and Dave work in the private sector. 
￿ Each person’s age is the same.
Angie and Brad work four years less and get five
times more retirement income than Courtney and
Dave. Does this really happen?  
Yes, it does. In the public sector, the median
retirement age is 58. In the private sector, it is 62.
After a 30-year career, the lump-sum value of a
middle-income public sector retiree’s pension is
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Thanks to Anne Mackay, ASA, and Faisal Siddiqi, FSA, FCIA for providing actuarial expertise to determine assumptions and perform calcu-
lations for numerical examples presented in this paper. I also thank Robin Banerjee, Robert D. Brown, Malcolm Hamilton, Ian Markham, Bill
Robson and members of the C.D. Howe Institute Pension Papers Advisory Panel for providing comments. Responsibility for any errors or
omissions is mine. 
1 Calculations for Angie and Brad are based on pension provisions typical of a public sector pension plan. The Courtney and Dave savings are 
what Statistics Canada reports is the median pension and RRSP accumulation for Canadian families in which the major earner is age 55 to 64
(including the public sector).
The example raises a question as to whether greater accumulation of retirement income in public sector pension plans may compensate for lower
wages than would be paid in the private sector for comparable work. This does not seem to be the case, at least in the federal public sector. A
recent Treasury Board of Canada study suggests that in 2003, federal public sector workers enjoyed a small wage premium over private sector
workers and that beginning in the early 2000s, salaries for federal public sector workers have increased at a higher rate than for private sector
workers (Treasury Board of Canada 2006). 
2 Public sector workers with less than 30 years of service will have lower pensions than the example suggests, but it appears reasonable to assume
that a large proportion of public sector workers will have 30 years of service at retirement: in fiscal year 2006/2007, federal public sector workers
retired with an average of 29.2 years of service. Pre-babyboomers retired with an average 26.7 years of service; babyboomers with an average 30.5
years (Statistics Canada 2008). 
Angie and Brad (Public Sector) 
￿ Angie and Brad start work at age 28 and retire at
age 58 after 30-year careers.
￿ Each earns $50,000 at retirement.
￿ The total value of their retirement savings is
$1,205,572: $602,786 each.
1
￿ From age 58 to age 65, their pension income is
$74,806, indexed.
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￿ From age 65, their total pension income is
$50,622, indexed and excluding government
pensions. 
￿ Brad and Angie collect their retirement income
for 27 years. 
Courtney and Dave (Private Sector)
￿ Courtney and Dave start work at age 28 and
retire at age 62 after 34-year careers.
￿ Each earns $50,000 at retirement.
￿ The total value of their retirement savings is
$244,800: $122,400 each. 
￿ They use their retirement savings to buy indexed
pension annuities.
￿ Their total retirement income is $11,652,
indexed and excluding government pensions.
￿ Dave and Courtney collect their retirement
income for 23 years.| 2 Commentary 275
routinely in a range between $600,000 and
1,300,000.
3 Multiply this by two for a family with
two public sector incomes; compare it to the
median retirement savings for Canadian families in
which the major income recipient is age 55 to 64:
$244,800 (Statistics Canada, 2008).
4
Private sector occupational or employer-sponsored
pension plan participation by Canadian workers is at
an all-time low of 23 percent. The remaining 77
percent with no pension coverage must rely on accu-
mulations in registered retirement savings plans
(RRSPs), home equity and non-sheltered savings to
supplement public pension benefits. In the public
sector, 80 percent of workers participate in defined-
benefit (DB) pension plans paying indexed pensions
typically replacing 60-70 percent of pre-retirement
earnings
5 (integrated with Canada/Quebec Pension
Plan benefits) and providing early-retirement and
bridging benefits to tide retirees over until public
pension benefits commence.
Most Canadians would agree that Courtney and
Dave’s pension of less than $1,000 per month isn’t
enough, even though that’s what many Canadians
will get. Courtney and Dave would need to save
more than twice as much to get half of Brad and
Angie’s pension income. We are delighted that
public-sector Angie and Brad have good pensions.
But we wonder why private-sector Courtney and
Dave don’t. What can be done to give them a better
chance of enjoying the same pleasant retirement as
Brad and Angie? 
This paper answers that question; it identifies the
key challenges to retirement income security for
private sector workers, and provides solutions: 
￿ Most private sector workers can’t participate in
the kinds of large, pooled pension arrangements
that serve public sector workers well. Legislation
governing pension plans must be amended to
facilitate participation by private sector workers
in pension plans similar to public sector plans.
This will allow private sector workers to access
the benefits of pension plan membership that
public sector workers enjoy: risk pooling,
economies of scale, and robust governance
oversight.
￿ No worker can participate in a pension plan
that isn’t sponsored by his or her employer.
This makes pension plan participation a
practical impossibility for self-employed
workers and employees of small and medium-
sized businesses, which often can’t afford to set
up pension plans. Canada’s income tax and
pension standards rules need to be changed to
de-link pension plan participation from
employment so that workers don’t have to
depend on their employers for pension saving
and to allow them to join pooled pension
arrangements offered by professional and trade
associations, employer associations and private
sector service providers.
￿ Legislation requiring employers to provide
similar pension benefits to employees of a
particular “class” and requiring employers to
fund at least half the cost of defined-benefit
pensions must be repealed to facilitate the
creation of new, more flexible pension
arrangements for workers who have no
coverage. 
￿ Tax rules need to become less restrictive to allow
more kinds of taxable income to be contributed
to a pension plan and to make the tax treatment
of administration expenses uniform for all
retirement savings vehicles.
￿ Tax limits on retirement saving make it difficult
for many private sector workers to save enough
for retirement and impossible in most cases to
achieve the same pension incomes as public
sector workers. To ensure all Canadians have
equal and equitable access to retirement saving
room, Canada should adopt a target accu-
mulation approach to retirement saving, with a
target of $1 million or more. 
The paper proceeds in six parts: i) it provides an
overview of the Canadian retirement saving system;
ii) compares pension coverage for public and private
sector workers in Canada; iii) describes how
C.D. Howe Institute
3 For pre-retirement salaries between $50,000 and $100,000 (see Table 8 on page 23). These figures do not include RRSP savings.
4 This median includes all Canadian families. It would be lower than $244,800 if public sector workers were excluded. 
5 The target benefit of a typical public sector pension plan is 70 percent of final average earnings after a 35-year career, offset at age 65 by
CPP/QPP benefits. See, for example Statistics Canada 2008 (Federal Public Service Retirements) at page 5 and Ontario Teachers Pension Plan
2006 at page 11. (Pretty much all public sector plans provide the same pension: 2 percent x final average earnings reduced at age 65 by 0.7
percent of final average earnings (because unreduced CPP/QPP benefits commence at age 65).Commentary 275 | 3
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Canadian pension regulations pose a barrier to
equitable access; iv) proposes a new approach to
pension risk; v) proposes a number of legislative
reforms that will give every Canadian worker the
opportunity to save for retirement; and vi) draws
conclusions for action by policymakers. 
The Canadian Retirement 
Saving System 
Retirement income in Canada is provided by three
“Pillars”:
￿ Pillar 1: the federal Old Age Security (OAS) 
and Guaranteed Income Supplement (GIS)
programs.
￿ Pillar 2: the Canada/Quebec Pension Plans
(C/QPP). 
￿ Pillar 3: private saving in registered pension
plans and RRSPs.
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Pillars 1 & 2: Public Pensions 
Paid from general tax revenue, OAS and GIS deliver
an indexed maximum benefit of about $14,000
annually at age 65. The second pillar programs, the
Canada and Quebec pension plans, are partially
funded by the invested contributions of employers
and employees, and currently pay an indexed
maximum benefit at age 65 of about $11,000. This
doesn’t mean Canadians can each count on getting a
$25,000 indexed pension from government sources.
The income-tested GIS benefit is quickly reduced
by other income (including C/QPP) and the OAS
benefit gradually reduces when retirement income
exceeds a threshold of about $65,000. The average
benefit paid by C/QPP is about half the maximum.
As a result, a typical retiree born in Canada with no
other sources of income won’t receive more than
$1,200 – $1,300 per month from government
sources. For recent immigrants, this amount will be
significantly lower for two reasons: residency
requirements to qualify for full OAS benefits; and
short C/QPP contribution periods. 
To enjoy the same standard of living they had
before retirement, most Canadian families will need
sufficient pension income to replace between 45 and
70 percent of their pre-retirement earnings, depen-
ding on their family circumstances (Hamilton 2000).
Benefits from Pillar 1 (OAS/GIS) and Pillar 2 (C/QPP)
won’t provide sufficient income to achieve replacement
ratios in this range for most Canadian families. They
will need to accumulate private retirement savings.
Pillar 3: Private Retirement Saving 
Most private retirement saving happens in registered
pension plans and RRSPs. Pension plans come in
two types: 
￿ Defined-benefit (DB) plans promise a benefit at
retirement, typically based on earnings and years
of service.
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￿ Defined-contribution (DC) plans and RRSPs
deliver a retirement income based on accu-
mulated contributions and investment income. 
Pension plans are heavily regulated. Federal and
provincial pension legislation sets standards for
funding, plan administration, vesting of benefits
and protection of pension assets from creditors. 
The federal Income Tax Act (ITA) and Income Tax
Regulations (ITR)
8 limit benefits that can be
provided by DB pension plans and tax sheltering of
contributions to DC pension plans and RRSPs. 
The Factor of 9
For to everyone who has, more shall be given,
and he will have an abundance; but from the
one who does not have, even what he does have
shall be taken away. (Matthew 25:29.)
The Canadian Pillar 3 story has always been 
one of winners and losers. In 1991, the federal gov-
ernment introduced “Pension Reform,” a com-
prehensive overhaul of tax rules that was supposed 
to level the playing field for pension plan
6 Deferred-profit-sharing plans are also used for retirement saving. They are functionally equivalent to DC pension plans and RRSPs. 
7 There are a variety of DB plan designs. For purposes of simplicity, this paper considers only DB plans that provide pensions based on a percentage
of pre-retirement earnings multiplied by years of employment service. As an example, a “2%” DB plan would deliver an annual pension of $30,000
after 30 years of service if pre-retirement earnings are $50,000 (2 % x $50,000 x 30 = $30,000). 
8 Hereinafter, collectively referred to as “tax rules.”members and RRSP savers by means of the “nine”
conversion factor and the Pension Adjustment (PA)
system, which reduces pension plan members’ RRSP
room. For a DC plan member, a PA is the sum of all
contributions made to the plan on his or her behalf.
For a DB plan member, the PA is a calculated
amount equal to nine multiplied by every dollar of
retirement pension notionally accrued during the
year, less $600. 
In theory, Pension Reform set annual limits on
retirement saving at the lesser of 18 percent of
“earned income” and the “money purchase limit” for
the year, irrespective of whether saving happens in a
DB pension plan, a DC pension plan or an RRSP.
DC and RRSP contributions are subject to hard
limits, but there is no cap on contributions to a DB
pension plan.
9 Pension Reform gives members of
DB pension plans – especially plans that provide
“ancillary”
10 benefits – much more savings room
because the “nine” factor used to equalize saving
room among different retirement savings vehicles
understates the real cost of benefits in many DB
pension plans – costs that substantially exceed
DC/RRSP contribution limits. Tax rules permit all
of these extra costs to be paid to a DB pension plan
as additional contributions on behalf of members. 
The “nine” factor allows much larger pension con-
tributions for public sector pension plan members
than would be possible in a DC plan or RRSP, even
while giving them significant RRSP contribution
room! How much more retirement saving room do
public sector workers have? A lot more: as Table 1
shows, a 55-year-old public sector worker earning
$60,000 has annual retirement saving room totalling
$25,002 in a typical public sector plan – more than
twice as much as the $11,235 of a private sector
worker who doesn’t have a pension plan. 
Determined in accordance with actuarial
standards, a number of conversion factors are used to
convert pension income to a lump sum, or a lump-
sum DC/RRSP account balance into a pension
income. Conversion factors vary considerably
depending on a number of variables, including a
plan member’s age, interest (discount) rates, whether
post-retirement indexing and other ancillary benefits
are provided, the age of pension commencement,
and the form in which a pension will be paid. 
Pension Reform made tax rules for pension plans
remarkably complex and largely incomprehensible
to everyone except pension experts. Most Canadians
still don’t know much about how our retirement
saving system works, which is probably why it 
has endured for almost 18 years without significant
challenge. In terms of equity of access to tax-
deferred retirement saving, the core failure of
Pension Reform is the “nine” conversion factor 
and other  prescribed factors that often impose
immediate tax on a portion of pension savings
transferred from a pension plan on termination 
of employment (Pierlot and Bonnar 2007).
Conversion factors prescribed by tax rules don’t
accurately reflect the value of participation in a 
DB pension plan; they are punitive to DB plan
members who transfer their benefits on termination
of employment; and they prevent the majority of
workers who don’t participate in generous DB
pension plans from accumulating the same pension
incomes as the minority of those who do. 
Table 1 shows the value of tax-deferred annual
retirement saving room in a typical public sector
plan, in 2008, for workers aged 25 to 55 who have
final-average earnings of $60,000. It also compares
that value to the annual retirement saving room
available with a DC pension plan or RRSP at the
same salary. The numbers demonstrate that tax rules
allow public sector DB pension plan members to
accumulate much more retirement savings than
would be possible in a DC Plan or RRSP: 
￿ During most of a public sector career, the Factor
of 9 considerably understates the value of public
sector pension plan participation.
￿ DC/RRSP savers can’t save more than 18
percent of effective earnings, but public sector
workers can save much more. For public sector
workers age 30 or over, annual retirement
savings room exceeds 18 percent of earnings and
reaches 40 percent of earnings in late career –
more than double the 18-percent limit that
applies to DC/RRSP savers.
9 Contributions to a DB plan are limited only indirectly: Provided that benefits are within the limits provided by tax rules and the plan’s
actuarial surplus does not exceed a legislated ceiling, every employer contribution to a DB pension plan is an “eligible contribution.” See
Income Tax Act (ITA) s. 147.2.
10 Ancillary benefits principally include bridge benefits, subsidized early retirement and indexing. 
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Presumably, Pillar 3 arrangements should allow
everyone to accumulate retirement savings that,
combined with Pillars 1 and 2 income, will be suf-
ficient to provide an adequate post-work standard of
living. But except for a fortunate minority partic-
ipating in generous DB pension plans, Pillar 3
schemes often fail to achieve this purpose because
tax rules prevent equitable access to retirement
saving room.
II. Pension Coverage in Canada
Public Sector Employees
The vast majority – about 80 percent – of Canada’s
3.2 million federal and provincial public sector
workers participate in DB pension plans. These
plans are remarkably consistent in terms of their
design and the benefits they provide. Though
employers pay most of the cost, public sector plans
are usually “jointly sponsored,” which means 
that both employer and employee contributions 
can fluctuate with a plan’s funded ratio – the 
ratio of plan assets to plan liabilities. Availability 
of benefits such as early-retirement eligibility 
and indexing may also change if contribution
adjustments are not sufficient to maintain a 
target funded ratio. 
Public Sector pension plans typically provide
target income replacement of 70 percent of final
earnings integrated with C/QPP benefits after a 35-
year career. These rates are slightly less than the
maximum permitted under tax rules. With 30 years
Table 1: Public Sector Pension Plan – Tax-Deferred Retirement Savings Room, 2008
Note: Retirement at age 58 with no early-retirement reduction. Pension is 1.3% < YMPE; 2% > YMPE (three-year average). Maximum per-
missible bridge. All benefits indexed at 2.5%. 60% J&S form of life pension with 5 year guarantee. CIAbasis as at January 2008. To
simplify the example, the $11,232 limit is determined as 18% of estimated final-year earnings of $62,400 (4% higher than FAE); it applies
to DC pension plan contributions made in 2008 and to RRSP contributions made in 2009 (see ITAsubsections 146.1(1) and 147.1(8)).
Source:  Actuarial calculations completed for this study.


























25 6.2068 1.7317 9 (2.7932) $6,485.22 $3,353.10 $9,838.32 $11,232 ($1,393.68)
30 7.5880 2.1170 9 (1.4120) $7,928.34 $3,353.10 $11,281.44 $11,232 $49.44
35 9.2763 2.5880 9 0.2763 $9,692.35 $3,353.10 $13,045.45 $11,232 $1,813.45
40 11.3404 3.1639 9 2.3404 $11,849.05 $3,353.10 $15,202.15 $11,232 $3,970.15
45 13.8640 3.8679 9 4.8640 $14,485.80 $3,353.10 $17,838.90 $11,232 $6,606.90
50 16.9488 4.7286 9 7.9488 $17,709.00 $3,353.10 $21,062.10 $11,232 $9,830.10
55 20.7200 5.7808 9 11.720 $21,649.38 $3,353.10 $25,002.48 $11,232 $13,770.48| 6 Commentary 275
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of service or with 80 or 85 “points”
11 a public sector
worker can expect to receive an immediate, actu-
arially unreduced lifetime pension, a temporary
“bridge” pension to replace OAS and C/QPP
benefits until age 65 and inflation indexing. For
workers in public safety occupations, unreduced
benefits are payable earlier. 
Not surprisingly, public sector workers retire early,
at a median age of 58 – almost five years earlier than
they did in 1987 (Statistics Canada 2004). Assuming
an average lifespan of 85 years, public sector
pensions will often be paid out during a retirement
that is almost as long as working life. The dis-
counted present value of a public sector pension
can, and often does, exceed $1 million.
Public sector plans are generally well managed.
With large pools of invested capital, public sector
plans have proven very good at leveraging
economies of scale to deliver pensions with very low
agency and unit administration costs. The annual
cost of managing a typical large public sector plan is
about 40 basis points
12 – less than one-fifth of the
typical annual management fee charged to small
investor holding a balanced mutual fund in an
RRSP. Although administrative costs are low,
benefits are generous. This means public sector
pensions come with a high price tag (mostly paid by
the employer) that can vary between 18 and 33
percent of total payroll, depending on how it is
measured (Office of the Superintendent of Financial
Institutions 2005). Few private sector employers
offer pensions this costly. 
Private Sector Employees 
Less than 30 percent of Canada’s private sector
employed workers have a pension plan. Private
sector DB plans typically offer less generous benefits
than in the public sector. Qualification periods for
early-retirement benefits are longer. If provided at
all, indexing is typically ad hoc and at rates below
inflation. Unsurprisingly, employed private sector
workers retire later than in the public sector, at a
median age of about 62 (Statistics Canada 2004).
Private sector employers are becoming
increasingly reluctant to sponsor DB pension plans
because of funding risk, accounting treatment of
pension obligations and uncertainty about
ownership of actuarial surpluses. Seeking greater
predictability of compensation costs, many
employers are terminating DB pension plans,
closing them to new entrants, converting them to
DC and/or replacing them with group RRSPs. A
long-term trend toward DC pension plans has
resulted in the percentage of private sector DC plan
members increasing from about 10 percent of total
pension plan membership in 1974 to more than 25
percent today (Tamagno 2006). 
11 The sum of age and years of employment service.
12 One basis point is equal to 1/100th of 1 percent.
Workers Pension Plan Members
Sector Number Number Proportion
Public Sector 3,151,200 2,700,000 85%
Private Sector 13,144,400 3,000,000 23%
All Sectors 16,295,600 5,700,000 35%
Table 2: Canadian Pension Plan Participation, 2005
Source: Statistics Canada, The Daily: "Pension Plans in Canada," June 21, 2007; Labour Force Survey, January 6, 2006. Private sector total
includes approximately 2.5 million self-employed workers.Commentary 275 | 7
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Employers typically contribute to DC plans at
lower rates. Administrative costs are usually paid by
plan participants. Because of liability risk, most
employers require DC plan members to select their
own investments from a stable of fund offerings
with management expense ratios (MERs) ranging
from 95 to 125 basis points, in a large DC pension
plan. MERs are even higher in smaller plans.
Members typically do a poor job of selecting
investments (Broadbent, Palumbo and Woodman
2006). The majority do not take advantage of
employer-provided education programs, do not
understand the basics of investment diversification
and do not review their portfolios regularly. Their
investment behaviour is generally characterized by
procrastination, inertia and overconfidence. The
unsurprising result is that member-selected
investments perform poorly (Tapia and Yermo
2007).
In late career, DC plan members
with capital market exposure face
significant investment volatility risk.
If a desired retirement date
coincides with a market correction,
a DC plan member delays
retirement or accepts a lower
standard of living. At the cost of
giving up potentially higher returns
from exposure to the capital
markets, immunization against investment risk is
possible by investing in high-quality fixed-income
securities of appropriate duration. Members seldom
choose this option. In fact, many make no choice at
all, preferring instead to allow contributions to be
deposited in whatever investment product the
sponsoring employer has identified as the “default”
option and putting off decisions about how they
will manage their savings until retirement. 
Retiring DC plan members must somehow
manage the risk that they will outlive their savings.
They can do this by purchasing annuities but
typically do not from fear they will not get full value
from the annuity if they die sooner than expected
and because retail annuity purchase rates are often
not favourable. Instead, they self-insure against
investment volatility and the possibility they may
outlive their savings by continuing to save during
retirement, potentially at the expense of not living
the post-work life they had hoped for.
The Self-Employed 
Canada has 2.6 million self-employed workers
(Statistics Canada 2008). They can’t join pension
plans because tax rules effectively limit pension plan
participation to workers whose employers sponsor
pension plans, either voluntarily or by collective
agreement. Pension benefit accrual is limited to a
percentage of “compensation,” which generally
means income from “an individual’s employment 
or office.”
13This makes many kinds of income
ineligible for pension saving, including self-
employment income, partnership income, business
income and investment income.
Some workarounds are possible,
but these come with high admin-
istrative costs and are typically 
used only by high-income indi-
viduals. The vast majority of the
self-employed must therefore 
rely on RRSPs.
The risks and drawbacks of
RRSPs are similar to DC pension
plans’: poorly selected investments,
investment volatility and limited
options for insuring against longevity risk. RRSP
owners seem as hapless as DC plan members – only
14 percent have a retirement plan and less than 31
percent have attempted to calculate the savings they’ll
need in retirement (Brown 2008). The MERs that
RRSP owners pay for their mutual fund holdings are
not deductible, whereas administration fees for a DC
pension plan are when  paid by an employer. Finally,
most provincial jurisdictions provide creditor pro-
tection for pension plans, but not for RRSPs. This
means that private sector business owners, who often
have fluctuating incomes and significantly greater risk
of financial loss than employees, have the additional
worry of seeing their retirement savings seized by a
creditor in the event of insolvency.
13 Income Tax Act (ITA) s.147.1
The risks and 
drawbacks of RRSPs 
are similar to DC
pension plans’| 8 Commentary 275
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New Canadians
Immigrant Canadians deserve special mention.
Often having shorter Canadian working careers,
immigrants receive less public pension benefits and
have less time to save for retirement. Tax rules are
especially prejudicial to new Canadians’ retirement
income security: with no RRSP contribution room
for years worked before coming to Canada, it is par-
ticularly hard for mid-career immigrants to
accumulate enough retirement savings. Predictably,
immigrant Canadians feel considerably less well-
prepared for retirement than the Canadian-born
and are less likely to expect their retirement incomes
to be adequate (Statistics Canada 2008). 
Non-Pension Saving
Other sources of personal wealth on which
Canadians draw in retirement include residential
equity, small business equity and non-sheltered
savings (Horner 2007). The Canadian tax regime
double-taxes savings because investment income
generated by after-tax income is itself taxed, subject
to limited exceptions.
14This means that non-
sheltered retirement saving is usually less effective
than tax-sheltered saving, leaving RRSPs as the best
retirement savings vehicle for those who cannot par-
ticipate in a pension plan because they do not
receive salary or wages.
III. Canadian Pension Regulation: 
The Barrier to Equitable Access
Multi-Sponsor Pension Plans
As a retirement saving vehicle, pension plans are
superior to RRSPs in every practical way. Pension
plans allow “autopilot” saving – this makes saving
happen.
15 Pooling funds in a pension plan reduces
unit administrative costs. Pension funds are
protected from creditors. Tax rules allow pension
accrual during periods of low/no income such as
disability, parental leave, and educational leave. In a
DB pension plan, members do not have to manage
their own funds, tax-deferral room is significantly
greater for older members, and longevity risk can be
pooled cost-effectively. None of these advantages are
currently available to members of employer-
sponsored DC pension plans and RRSP savers. 
Certainly, employers who wish to do so should be
able to sponsor and contribute to pension plans for
their employees. But this does not mean that
Canadians should be forced to rely on their
employers’ munificence for their retirement income
security. They should have the opportunity to par-
ticipate in any pooled pension saving arrangement
that meets reasonable fiduciary and governance
standards. This means having the option of joining
a multi-sponsor pension arrangement of their choice
that offers the same economies of scale and benefits
as are now enjoyed by members of public sector 
DB pension plans.
But they can’t. Why not? No single rule in
Canadian tax and pension standards legislation
prevents Canadian workers from joining a 
multi-sponsor pension plan (MSPP). Rather, a 
confluence of rules makes participation in an 
MSPP a practical impossibility for most.
16
Barriers to Establishing an MSPP
MSPPs are subject to governance requirements that
make them difficult to establish and risky for those
charged with their administration. Canada’s 10
pension standards jurisdictions typically require that
an MSPP be established and administered by a
14 Some deferral (and a lower tax rate) is available for capital gains generated by saving. In addition, the 2008 federal budget’s introduction of
Tax-Free Savings Accounts affords a new opportunity to accumulate a limited amount of savings without tax on investment earnings. 
15 As noted in a previous paper of this series, a considerable body of “behavioural finance” research suggests that automatic enrolment with an
option to opt out results in higher rates of pension plan participation and better retirement savings outcomes (Ambachtsheer 2008).
16 In pension nomenclature, “sponsor” means the person who funds pension benefits where “fund” means to take on risk. In a DB pension plan,
this entails an obligation to underwrite a future benefit promise. In a DC pension plan, risk rests mostly with members, even though
employers are referred to as “sponsors” because they make contributions. Most pension plans are sponsored by one or more employers; some
are jointly sponsored by employers and employees; a few are sponsored by members through their trade unions. Throughout this paper, and in
support of the policy position that individuals should be able to sponsor their own pensions (with or without the assistance of an employer),
we use the terms “sponsor” and “multi-sponsor” in preference to “employer” and “multi-employer” unless the context requires otherwise. The
acronym “MSPP” should be taken to mean “multi-employer pension plan” or “multi-sponsor pension plan” as the context requires.board of trustees or pension committee, usually
with member representation. As an example,
Ontario pension standards legislation requires that a
pension plan sponsored by unrelated employers
must be administered by a board of trustees, at least
half of whom are pension plan members.
17Tax rules
are much less restrictive, requiring only that an
administrator be “a person or body of persons” a
majority of whom reside in Canada.
18
Committee or board members who administer an
MSPP are generally subject to a statutorily imposed,
fiduciary standard of care that cannot be limited by
contract. For example, Ontario legislation requires a
pension plan administrator to “exercise the care,
diligence and skill” in the investment of a pension
fund and to use “all relevant knowledge and skill
that the administrator possesses or, by reason of the
administrator’s profession, business or calling, ought
to possess.”
19 Pension plan administration, reg-
ulatory compliance and investment management
demand a variety of specialized skills and training
well beyond the competencies of the average person.
The various tasks associated with operating a
pension plan can be outsourced to service providers
and usually are, but this does not absolve members
of a board or committee from the responsibility 
to oversee and monitor the administration of an
MSPP. 
Fiduciary responsibility is a significant disin-
centive for anyone to participate on a board or
committee of administration. Pension plan adminis-
trators can and do get sued and since pension plan
assets and liabilities are usually quite substantial, it
can be difficult to obtain liability insurance. Even
when board and committee members who don’t
have the expertise to administer a pension plan do
their best to select competent third-party service
providers, they continue to have an oversight
obligation. If something goes wrong, they will have
little recourse against service providers, who usually
limit their liability to the amount of fees paid under
a service agreement. This is not to suggest that all
Canadian pension plan administrators are stuck in a
quagmire of ruinous litigation. But pension plan
members are becoming increasingly litigious and in
disputes about pensions, breach of fiduciary duty is
routinely alleged.
20 Whether or not such allegations
can be proven, pension plan administrators must
defend themselves. 
With limited exceptions, current governance
requirements effectively prevent MSPPs from being
established and administered on a purely contractual
basis in a variety of more flexible legal arrangements
that would not necessarily involve governance by a
board or committee. This makes it difficult for asso-
ciations of workers or professionals to set up an
MSPP to which members can subscribe, and it
prevents private sector service providers from
offering MSPPs on a subscription basis. Some juris-
dictions do allow financial institutions to offer
“simplified” pension plans that provide DC-only
benefits. Adapted to the needs of small businesses,
simplified pension plans shift administrative and
fiduciary responsibilities from the sponsoring
employer to the financial institution that manages
the plan (RRQ 2006).
No Job? No Pension Plan 
On the Canadian retirement landscape, a mouldy
feudalism lingers. To participate in a pension plan,
tax rules require that you work for an employer who
sponsors one, either individually or with other
employers.
21This is a throwback to an earlier time
when pension plans were a tool employers used
primarily to reward long service. Today, it’s hard to
think of a good reason why pension plan parti-
cipation should be restricted to employees or indeed,
forcibly linked to employment in any way. Private
sector employers don’t have to sponsor pension
plans and most do not. This leaves RRSPs – with
their limited saving room and lack of creditor pro-
tection – as the only option for most individuals. 
The unnecessary linkage between income from
employment and pension plan participation makes
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17 Pension Benefits Act (PBA) (Ontario). Section 8.
18 ITA s 147.1(6).
19 PBA. Section 22. Emphasis added.
20 See, for example Slater Steel Inc (Re), 2008 ONCA 196 (CanLII).
21 ITA s. 147.1; ITR s. 8502(1)| 10 Commentary 275
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the benefits of pension plans practically unavailable
to employees of small and medium-sized enterprises
that typically do not sponsor pension plans, and to
non-employees such as self-employed tradespersons,
professionals and partners of professional part-
nerships. More than 25 years ago, United States
policymakers realized this didn’t make sense and
amended the tax code to allow self-employed indi-
viduals the same kinds of pension arrangements
hitherto available only to employees. Canada still
hasn’t seen the light. 
To participate in a pension plan, it’s not enough
just to have employment income. Tax rules require
that the employer you work for must sponsor the
pension plan to which you belong. Otherwise, a
plan’s registration may be denied or revoked, with
severe tax consequences. Tax authorities have
demonstrated considerable zeal in deregistering
pension plans where they take the view that no bona
fide employment relationship exists (Steele 2007).
This means that even with employment income,
many Canadians – typically those employed by
small and medium-sized businesses – have no
pension coverage because their employers cannot
afford the expense of establishing pension plans.
This leaves a majority of Canadian workers with no
pension coverage entirely reliant on RRSPs and
other forms of saving. Arbitrary links between
income from employment with a particular
employer and pension plan participation need to be
eliminated. This would allow Canadian workers to
join any bona fide pension arrangement.
You Can’t Buy Your Own Pension
Tax and pension standards rules generally require
that at least 50 percent of the cost of a DB pension
be paid by a plan member’s employer. Except in
multi-employer plans and certain union plans,
members are prohibited from contributing extra to
pay off funding deficiencies. For DC pension plans,
tax rules require that each participating employer
contribute a minimum of 1 percent of the remu-
neration of participating members. 
Fewer and fewer employers are willing to take on
the accounting and financial risks associated with
underwriting a DB-benefit promise. Others avoid
establishing DC pension plans because they entail
an ongoing obligation to contribute a percentage of
payroll irrespective of financial results, as well as a
fiduciary obligation to make appropriate investment
choices available and to inform members regularly
about those choices.
22 As a result, rules restricting
individuals from paying for their own pensions and
joining any bona fide pension arrangement may be
the greatest obstacles to increased pension coverage
for Canadians. 
Many employers would likely be more willing to
establish pension plans to help employees save for
retirement if they could choose if and when they
make contributions and how much
funding/fiduciary risk they will take on. Perhaps
Canada’s most innovative pension watchdog, the
Régie des rentes du Quebec, has recognized employers’
reticence toward funding/fiduciary risk and, in
2007, introduced a new type of DB pension plan
funded by variable member contributions and a
fixed employer contribution.
23 Quebec has also
amended its pension legislation to allow pension
committees responsible for plan administration to
delegate administrative tasks and fiduciary responsi-
bilities to service providers. So far, no other
regulator has followed suit. 
The requirement that an employer fund at least
part of the cost of a pension is a major impediment
to the establishment of multi-sponsor arrangements.
Because an employer must be involved, individuals
cannot practically set up their own pension plans or
work together to co-sponsor “co-op” pension
arrangements funded with their own money.
Similarly, private sector service providers cannot
offer pooled pension savings arrangements to 
individuals on a for-profit, subscription basis.
Class Struggle
Most pension standards legislation requires that the
same benefits be provided to employees within the
22 For a discussion of the fiduciary risks of DC pension plan sponsorship and how they might be addressed, see Robson 2007.
23 Somewhat perversely, Quebec passed Bill 68 in 2008 to restrict benefit reductions in multi-employer DB pension plans that are not established
as “member-funded” plans and even where the terms of a negotiated multi-employer plan may make the provision of benefits contingent upon
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same “class,” with class distinctions based on factors
such as an employee’s position, work location, or
date of hire. Although different benefits can be
provided to different classes, an individual member
generally cannot be treated as a class. This effectively
prohibits pension plan members and sponsoring
employers from negotiating individual com-
pensation “deals” that provide for individualized
rates of pension contribution or accrual tailored to
each particular member’s life situation and financial
needs. Given the increasing popularity of flexible
benefits arrangements that allow employees to
choose how a fixed amount or percentage of salary
will be allocated to non-cash benefits such as
medical/dental insurance, RRSP saving, or life
insurance, Canada’s provincial rules requiring
similar benefits to be provided to employees within
a class are an anachronism. In the UK, where
pension legislation is much more flexible, some
employers are rejecting a “we know best” approach
in favour of letting employees decide how much of
their pay they will allocate to the company pension
plan (Coles 2008).
Rigid Tax Rules
Tax rules also don’t allow individuals to choose how
much of their total annual compensation they will
allocate to retirement saving, and when. Two key
impediments prevent individuals from funding
toward a target pension benefit when they can
afford to. First, as noted above, individuals cannot
fund their own DB pensions. Second, by restricting
the amount of pension an individual can accrue in a
particular year to the lesser of 2 percent of an
individual’s compensation and an indexed dollar
limit ($2,333 in 2008), tax rules set limits on
annual DB contributions and accruals. Catch-up
funding toward a target benefit is practically
unavailable even for many DB plan members,
because past-service DB funding must relate to
employment service with an employer who sponsors
a DB pension plan and who will permit the past-
service benefits to be provided. DC catch-up
funding is not possible because tax rules prohibit
“past service” DC contributions. 
It is true that carry-forward of unused accu-
mulated RRSP contribution room does allow for
some catch-up saving. But only partially: inflation
erodes the value of accumulated RRSP contribution
room. In addition, since RRSP contribution limits
are determined annually as a percentage of income
capped by a dollar limit, two individuals with
similar lifetime incomes will have different con-
tribution limits if one’s income fluctuates
substantially but the other’s does not, as Table 3
demonstrates.
Table 3 shows two workers who earn approx-
imately $755,000 over 10 years. The employee’s
salary increases 5 percent per year. The self-
employed worker has negative/low income initially
that increases as the enterprise succeeds – the typical
“J” curve of a business venture. Each worker con-
tributes the maximum permitted by tax rules and
earns a compound return of 7 percent. After 10
years, the employed worker is ahead by $24,667 in
RRSP contribution room and $52,269 in accu-
mulated savings, enough to buy $3,555 more
annual pension.
24
Same income; different RRSP savings room: what
gives? This happens because RRSP contributions are
subject to an annual limit as a percentage of income,
not an annual or lifetime nominal limit. In addition
to having less RRSP room, the self-employed
worker will pay more tax because his/her income
will be disproportionately taxed at higher marginal
rates, though this discrepancy may be offset to some
degree by opportunities to deduct expenses that the
employed taxpayer does not have. 
The example in Table 3 would apply similarly in
a situation where a worker leaves the workforce to
retrain and ceases to earn. During the retraining
period, the worker will not accumulate RRSP con-
tribution room, but if fortunate enough to be a
member of a pension plan sponsored by an
employer who grants a leave of absence, tax rules
allow continued pension contributions based on
“prescribed compensation” – earnings the worker is
deemed to receive while receiving no earnings at all.
This is just one example of differing tax treatment
for pension plan members and RRSP owners. 
Tables 4 and 5 below provide another example
demonstrating how tax rules disadvantage the
24 CIA annuity purchase basis as at January 2008 (unisex). Life form of pension payable at age 60 with 10-year guarantee. Not indexed. | 12 Commentary 275
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2003 $60,000 $10,800 $14,500 $10,800 $10,800
2004 $63,000 $11,340 $15,500 $11,340 $22,896
2005 $66,150 $11,907 $16,500 $11,907 $36,406
2006 $69,458 $12,502 $18,000 $12,502 $51,456
2007 $72,930 $13,127 $19,000 $13,127 $68,186
2008 $76,577 $13,784 $20,000 $13,784 $86,743
2009 $80,406 $14,473 $21,000 $14,473 $107,288
2010 $84,426 $15,197 $22,000 $15,197 $129,995
2011 $88,647 $15,957 $22,550 $15,957 $155,051
2012 $93,080 $16,754 $23,114 $16,754 $182,659
Totals $754,674 $135,841 $182,659
2003 ($5,000) $0 $14,500 $0 0
2004 $2,000 $360 $15,500 $360 360
2005 $15,000 $2,700 $16,500 $2,700 $3,085
2006 $25,000 $4,500 $18,000 $4,500 $7,801
2007 $40,000 $7,200 $19,000 $7,200 $15,547
2008 $60,000 $10,800 $20,000 $10,800 $27,436
2009 $100,000 $18,000 $21,000 $18,000 $47,356
2010 $125,000 $22,500 $22,000 $22,000 $72,671
2011 $192,000 $34,560 $22,550 $22,500 $100,258
2012 $200,674 $36,000 $23,114 $23,114 $130,390
Totals $754,674 $111,174 $130,390
Table 3: Effect of Fluctuating Income on RRSP Contribution Room
a Employment/earned income are for the previous year.
b After 2010 (the last year of fixed limits), the RRSP dollar limit is assumed to increase at 2.5 percent/year.
Employed Worker
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2002 $60,000 $0 $0 13.7207 $0
2003 $63,000 $10,800 $10,800 14.2832 $756
2004 $66,150 $11,340 $22,842 14.8688 $1,536
2005 $69,458 $11,907 $36,234 15.4785 $2,341
2006 $72,930 $12,502 $51,091 16.1132 $3,171
2007 $76,577 $13,127 $67,540 16.7737 $4,027
2008 $80,406 $13,784 $85,714 17.4615 $4,909
2009 $84,426 $14,473 $105,758 18.1774 $5,818
2010 $88,647 $15,197 $127,829 18.9227 $6,755
2011 $93,080 $15,957 $152,094 19.6985 $7,721
2012 $97,734 $16,754 $178,735 20.5061 $8,716
Totals $135,841 $178,735 $8,716
Table 4: Joe – RRSP Only
a CIAannuity purchase basis as at January 2008 (unisex). Life form of pension payable at age 60 with 10-year guarantee. Not indexed.
Year Income RRSP room RRSP Balance Annuity Factora Expected Pension
Income
Pension Value of Expected
Accrued Pension Commuted RRSP RRSP Deferred Annuity Pension
Year Income Pension
a Adjustment Value room Balance Income Factor
b Income
2002 $60,000 $0 $7,500 $0 $0 $0 $0 13.7207 $0.00
2003 $63,000 $858 $7,905 $10,647 $3,300 $3,300 $13,947 14.2832 $976.47
2004 $66,150 $1,801 $8,330 $23,468 $3,435 $6,950 $30,417 14.8688 $2,045.71
2005 $69,458 $2,837 $8,777 $38,785 $3,577 $10,978 $49,763 15.4785 $3,214.99
2006 $72,930 $3,972 $9,246 $56,965 $3,726 $15,417 $72,382 16.1132 $4,492.08
2007 $76,577 $5,213 $9,738 $78,419 $3,882 $20,301 $98,720 16.7737 $5,885.42
2008 $80,406 $6,569 $10,255 $103,613 $4,046 $25,667 $129,279 17.4615 $7,403.67
2009 $84,426 $8,047 $10,798 $133,069 $4,218 $31,553 $164,623 18.1774 $9,056.44
2010 $88,647 $9,656 $11,367 $167,379 $4,399 $38,003 $205,383 18.9227 $10,853.77
2011 $93,080 $11,407 $11,966 $207,205 $4,589 $45,063 $252,267 19.6985 $12,806.43
2012 $97,734 $13,308 $12,594 $253,293 $4,789 $52,780 $306,073 20.5061 $14,925.94
Totals $253,293 $39,961 $52,780 $306,073 $14,925.94
Table 5: Bob – Defined Benefit Plan with RRSP
Notes: 
a Pension is 1.5% FAE (3 years); Normal form: 60% survivor benefit; 2% fixed-rate indexing; no bridge; unreduced. 
bCIAannuity purchase basis as at January 2008 (unisex). Life form of pension payable at age 60 with 10-year guarantee. Not indexed.| 14 Commentary 275
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majority of those who save in an RRSP as compared
to the minority who are members of DB pension
plans. Joe and Bob are 50 years old, have identical
incomes and save for retirement at the maximum
levels permitted by the rules. Joe relies on an RRSP;
Bob is a member of a DB pension plan. Each retires
at age 60. Joe uses his RRSP savings to buy a
pension annuity. Bob buys an annuity with his
RRSP savings and the commuted lump-sum value
of his pension income. Result? The value of Bob’s
savings is $127,338 more than Joe’s savings, 
which equates to $6,209 more in annual lifetime
pension income.
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When a Buck Is Not a Buck
First proffered by Kenneth Carter
in the 1966 Report of the Royal
Commission on Taxation, the
simple principle that “a buck is a
buck is a buck” is an ideal to
which Canada’s retirement saving
system has never pretended to
aspire. Carter believed that since
all forms of income increase
wealth equally, they should all be
taxed equally. It’s not too much of a stretch to
suggest that the same principle should apply to
retirement saving by allowing pension contributions
to be made from any kind of taxable income. But
many kinds of income cannot be contributed to a
pension plan, including income from business, self-
employment, property, and investments. 
There is no sound policy basis for restricting
pension saving to employment income or RRSP
saving to “earned income.” This is not to suggest
that policymakers should not set limits on how
much income can be temporarily sheltered from tax
in a pension plan. Consumption tax advocates
might argue that unlimited deferral should be
permitted in a retirement savings vehicle because
eventually, all deferred income is withdrawn and
taxed with no net loss to the treasury. But notwith-
standing the advantages of a consumption tax
regime, unlimited pension saving would seem dis-
proportionately to benefit those who are already
well-prepared for retirement – high-income earners.
It could also create cash-flow problems for finance
ministers and compliance challenges for taxing
authorities seeking to forestall creative schemes to
entirely avoid tax on large amounts of deferred
income. 
Reasonable limits on income deferral have been a
cornerstone principle on which Canada’s Pillar 3
retirement savings system is based. This should not
change. What should change is how those limits are
determined and applied so that all Canadians, no
matter how they earn their living, can practically
access the same saving limits. Eliminating arbitrary
distinctions between types of income eligible for
pension saving will help make this happen.
Gradual and Uniform, or Neither?
The Canadian retirement savings
regulatory paradigm is founded
on a fiction; namely, that workers
can and should save for
retirement in a regular, pre-
dictable manner from the
moment they begin working
until they retire. Financial insti-
tutions promote early, regular
retirement saving in television, newspaper and
even public transit advertisements, the latter
often targeted toward youth. 
Early, regular saving for retirement certainly is
good for fund managers, but does it serve the
interests of Canadian workers?  In most cases,
probably not. The notion that retirement saving
is the best way to allocate limited financial
resources in early career is seriously flawed, failing
as it does to acknowledge that the ability and
inclination to save for retirement vary con-
siderably as a function of age, income and
non-discretionary expenses. 
For most people, it is sensible to defer deferred-
income saving until the later years of working
life. As it happens, this is exactly how traditional
DB pension plans work. As Figure 1 demon-
strates, the pattern of retirement income accrual
in a typical final-pay DB pension plan dovetails
naturally with the lifetime earning and con-
25 Idem.
Early, regular saving for
retirement certainly is
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sumption pattern of a typical worker, whose
income is much more likely to exceed non-discre-
tionary spending in late career.
However rational and appropriate the DB funding
paradigm may be, the vast majority of Canadian
private sector workers cannot and do not benefit
from it. By comparison, most public sector workers
do and it is not an overstatement to say that in
Canada, public sector, multi-employer DB pension
plans are the gold standard for delivery of secure, pre-
dictable and adequate post-work income replacement
with remarkably low administration costs. 
This does not mean that public sector pension
plans do not face challenges. All DB plan adminis-
trators struggle to manage the volatility of funded
ratios – the degree to which the value of plan assets
exceeds, or is less than, estimated liabilities. This
makes it difficult to predict contribution obligations
and sometimes requires adjustments to benefits.
This volatility arises from the fact that DB plan
sponsors typically seek to lower the normal cost of
pension funding by investing in public and private
capital markets. Experience to date suggests that this
strategy may work, but that it comes at the price of
having to try to match assets invested in illiquid
and/or volatile instruments with bond-like pension
obligations that have a predictable, long-term
payment horizon.
If the public sector DB model works so well, why
can’t it work in the private sector? In a public sector
pension plan, the risk of making good on DB
pension promises is underwritten by public sector
employers who, with access to tax revenue, have
practically bottomless pockets. The pockets of
private sector employers do have a bottom, so it’s
not surprising they are unwilling to take on the
same level of risk. 
In suspending, closing, and converting their DB
pension plans to DC, private sector employers have
voted with their feet. They are choosing not to take
on pension funding risk and have shifted that risk to
employees – a risk that individuals without occu-
pational pension plans have always had. Thus, the
essential condition for making something akin to a
public sector DB plan viable in the private sector is
to allow workers to join pension plans in which they
take on DB funding and investment risk indi-
vidually and personally, just as they now do in their
DC pension plans and RRSPs. 
This would mean that, as in a DC plan or RRSP,
the account balance of a member of a private sector


























Figure 1: Retirement Income Accrual in a Typical Defined-Benefit Plan
Source: Data from Table 7. Section 11 of the Ontario Pension Benefits Act provides that a pension plan cannot be registered unless "it 
provides for the accrual of pension benefits in a gradual and uniform manner." As Figure 1 shows, benefit accrual in a final-pay 
DB plan cannot be "gradual and uniform."| 16 Commentary 275
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would be equal to aggregate contributions, plus
investment returns. But unlike a DC plan or RRSP,
the member would have the opportunity to con-
tribute whatever amounts were required to fund the
same level of pension benefits that a public sector
employee at the same salary level could expect to
receive at retirement. Alternatively, private sector
workers could negotiate compensation packages
whereby fixed employer contributions would 
pay for some or most of the cost of funding a DB
pension, much as is now done by unions who
sponsor multi-employer pension plans and negotiate
fixed employer contributions on behalf of their
members. 
IV. A New Approach to Pension Risk
The Two Solitudes: DB and DC
Much current discussion about pension benefit
coverage, benefit adequacy and benefit security is
mired in an unhelpful DB-DC debate: Are DB
pension plans sustainable? Can DC pension plans
deliver adequate retirement income?
The right question is “What can we do so
everyone can have a pension?” because it shifts the
focus from a debate about plan design to a dis-
cussion about what strategies could work to achieve
broad-based, sufficient pension coverage – precisely
the mandate of the Alberta/British Columbia
Pension Standards Review launched in 2007. That
enquiry will lead to a discussion of pension risks,
who bears them and how we could design flexible
retirement income accumulation arrangements that
combine the best of what current DB and DC
pension plans have to offer. 
Despite the obvious superiority of large, DB
pension plans in terms of their ability to pool risk
and deliver predictable benefits at low administration
unit costs, many employers are turning away from
them. Why? The answer, which is not particularly
complicated, is found in a regulatory regime that
imposes benefit funding restrictions that make DB
pension plans unsustainable for many employers
from a risk-management point of view, mask the
true cost of funding benefits for particular plan
members and result in intergenerational subsidies
among members. 
Risk Profile by Plan Type
Table 6 identifies some key pension risks and who is
thought to bear them in traditional DB and DC
occupational pension plans. Table 6 shows that the
most important factor in determining who bears
pension risk is plan design and that in traditional
occupational pension plans, DB employers and DC
members have similar risks. But Table 6 doesn’t tell
the whole story about who bears longevity, funding,
sufficiency and security risk because some plans
providing DB benefits shift most risk to members;
others providing DC-style benefits involve con-
siderable risk for employers. In simple terms, risk
sharing in different plan designs can be mapped on
a continuum (see Figure 2).
EMPLOYER-SPONSORED DB: A “traditional” DB
pension plan promises a benefit and the employer
funds it according to estimates provided by the plan
actuary. Most traditional DB pension plans don’t
require employee contributions because employee
contributions determined as a percentage of salary
have little effect on the volatility of an employer’s
contribution obligations, which may vary con-
siderably due to factors such as fluctuations in
interest rates, equity market returns, inflation,
changes in life expectancy and member demo-
graphics. However, members have risk too. If the
employer’s pension funding cost increases, they 
are at risk of layoff, of not receiving a salary increase,
or of receiving a reduced benefit if the employer
becomes bankrupt when a pension plan is not 
fully funded.
26
26 As discussed in a previous paper in this series, the cost of funding an employer-sponsored DB pension plan may be considered to fall upon
employees because where an employer pays more to fund a pension plan, it can be expected that in a competitive labour market, concessions
will (sooner or later) be extracted from employees’ other compensation. Because reductions to other forms of compensation don’t always
happen immediately, employer-sponsored DB pension plans allow for risk pooling among cohorts of pension plan members, which in turn
implies that intergenerational wealth transfers occur within DB plans (Pesando 2008). However, even though the cost of funding a DB
pension plan may ultimately be passed on to employees, many employers avoid DB pension plans because of the risks and difficulties of
managing contribution volatility associated with asset-liability mismatch and because of uncertainty of title to actuarial surpluses.Commentary 275 | 17
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Longevity – risk of outliving pension savings
– risk of increased cost to pay pensions 




– risk of having to consume savings 





Funding – risk that contribution obligations 
will fluctuate or increase
sometimes ✔✔
Sufficiency – risk of having to delay retirement or
accept a lower standard of living
✔✔
Security – risk that promised pensions won't be
paid due to insufficient assets
✔
Fiduciary – risk of civil or statutory liability for 
failing to meet required standard of 
care in pension plan administration
✔✔
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Figure 2: The Pension Risk Continuum
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PUBLIC SECTOR DB: Most public sector DB plans are
“jointly-sponsored.” The members may have more
risk than in a traditional DB plan because the per-
centage of salary they have to contribute can vary
with the funded status of the plan. In addition,
benefits may be reduced or increased as a function
of the plan’s funded position. However, the majority
of risk is still borne by the employer. As with a tra-
ditional DB pension plan, assets and liabilities are
pooled among members and retirees. 
CASH BALANCE: A popular design in the United
States, a “cash balance” pension plan operates like a
DC plan in that assets are allocated to members
individually, but members are immunized to some
extent from investment volatility because the
employer takes on risk in the form of an obligation
to fund the plan as necessary to credit member
accounts with a promised rate of return. Tax rules
do not permit cash balance plans to be registered 
in Canada. 
HYBRID: Hybrid pension plans come in a variety of
designs that provide DB or DC benefits, or both.
Allocation of risk depends on the design. 
MEMBER-FUNDED DB: Member-funded DB pension
plans are typically managed by unions and have
multiple participating employers, who contribute
fixed amounts as negotiated in a collective
agreement. For employers, the risk is similar to
sponsoring a traditional DC pension plan because
they have no obligation to pay more if the plan
doesn’t have enough funds to pay promised benefits
– until a contribution increase is negotiated at the
next round of bargaining. Thus, the risk of funding
deficiencies is largely (but not entirely) borne by 
the members. 
TRADITIONAL DC: Employer and member contri-
butions are invested in each member’s account, and
retirement income will be whatever the contributions
and investment accumulated in the account will
buy. Since the employer’s only obligation is to con-
tribute fixed amounts, the member bears the risk 
of not having enough to retire and of losses due to
investment volatility. However, the employer has
fiduciary risk arising from an ongoing obligation 
to make appropriate investment choices and
information available to members. 
DB and DC: Getting the Best of Both
What is the difference between traditional 
occupational DC and DB plans that is largely
responsible for the increasing shift to DC
arrangements, as well as for the continuing and
largely futile debate as to how the DC trend can be
reversed? In a DC pension plan, assets and liabilities
for a particular member are always knowable and
equal. In a DB pension plan, assets and liabilities 
for a particular member are always unknowable 
and unequal, except when benefits are settled in 
a lump-sum on pre-retirement termination of
employment.
27
What if a DB plan could operate like a DC plan?
This would mean allocating assets and liabilities of a
DB pension plan to members individually, rather
than pooling them. Pension plan members and
employers (if any) could then negotiate with pretty
good information on how much a DB pension
benefit will cost, who will fund it, and when. As
with a DC pension plan, employers could limit
their funding risk and know exactly their total com-
pensation obligation to each employee. Able to
access the funding flexibility of a DB pension plan,
members would be able to ensure more adequate
and predictable benefit payments in retirement. 
Table 7 provides a snapshot of how assets and lia-
bilities might look for an employed worker in a
self-funded DB plan during a 30-year career. The
plan provides a 1.5 percent final-pay pension. The
employer contributes 7 percent of salary. The
member contributes the additional amounts
required to fully fund the pension on a going-
concern basis.
27 There are two reasons for this:  First, the current tax and regulatory regime requires DB pension plans to pool assets and liabilities, even though
it is possible – and arguably more equitable – to track assets and liabilities in every pension plan on a member-by-member basis as is the norm
in a DC plan. Second, although actuaries can provide estimates, the exact quantum of a liability for a pension benefit payable at some point in
the future can never be known with certainty.Commentary 275 | 19
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As with all final-pay DB plans, the cost of
funding a pension rises dramatically as the worker
ages. In this example, the 7 percent employer con-
tribution covers most of the cost of accruing
benefits in early career, but much less in late career.
What happens if the member contributes less than
required to fully fund accrued benefits?  The answer
is obvious: the member will receive a lower benefit –
equivalent to what a DC pension plan with a 7
percent employer contribution rate would provide
along with whatever contributions the member
chooses to make. But for the member, the self-
funded DB arrangement will be far preferable to a
DC plan because it offers what no DC plan can: the
opportunity to fund to a predictable target benefit
and the flexibility to decide when to fund it. 
A self-funded DB model fits much better with
the real world than do current DC models that
exhort individuals to save as much as they can, as
soon as they can. When workers don’t have much
disposable income in early- to mid-career, employer
contributions will pay for a greater share of the cost
of pension accrual. In late career when workers are
more likely to have extra cash, they can contribute
more, perhaps from lump-sum amounts from
incentive pay or severance. The availability of a self-
funded pension model would improve pension
coverage in two ways: 
￿ The model would encourage more employers to
establish DB pension plans by making it
possible to establish a DB pension plan without
taking on funding risk. 
￿ By allowing for individual tracking of assets and
liabilities, the model would make it possible for
workers (with or without their employers) to
participate in multi-sponsor arrangements in
which funds are pooled to lower unit adminis-
tration and investment costs through economies
of scale, but risks are not. Moreover, when
members of a multi-sponsor arrangement
change jobs, they would not need to change
pension plans.
A key advantage of a self-funded pension model 
is that it eliminates costly disputes about surplus
ownership. Each member would own his or her
surplus (assets exceeding amounts required to buy
the pension that can be provided by the plan). 
Each would individually bear the risk of deficits.
However, and as current tax rules permit, there is 
no reason why employers should not have option of
taking on part or all of funding risk, such as guar-
anteeing a minimum rate of return on employee
contributions, providing supplementary funding at
termination or retirement to ensure a minimum
benefit, or underwriting pensions in pay. 
2008 Going Concern  Going Concern
Age/ Pension Annuity Accrued Normal Accrued Accrued
Service Salary Accrual Factor Pension Cost Employer Member Liability Assets
30/0 $30,000 $450 2.3448 $0  $3,046  $2,100  $946 $0  $0 
35/5 $36,500 $548 3.2112 $6,498 $4,173 $2,555  $1,618 $20,865 $20,865 
40/10 $44,400 $666 4.3995 $12,993  $5,716  $3,108  $2,608  $57,163 $57,163 
45/15 $54,000 $810 6.0278 $19,482  $7,829  $3,780  $4,049  $117,436  $117,436 
50/20 $65,700 $986 8.2586 $25,977  $10,727  $4,599  $6,128  $214,533  $214,533 
55/25 $79,900 $1,199 11.3150 $32,457  $14,690 $5,593  $9,097  $367,254 $367,254 
59/29 $93,500 $1,403 14.5562 $37,662 $18,903 $6,545 $12,359  $548,214  $548,214 
60/30 $97,200 $1,458 15.5025 $38,945  $0  $0  $0  $603,738 $603,738
Table 7: Career Overview – Self-Funded DB Pension
Note:  Salary/service as at Jan. 1/08. 60% joint-and-survivor pension payable at age 60. No bridge benefit. Post-retirement indexing 
2.0%. Discount rate: 6.5%. EROA6.5% Salary increases: 4%/year. Projected Unit Credit Method; earnings projected to age 60.
Assets/liabilities at beginning of year.
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But what happens at retirement?  In a traditional
DB pension plan, pensions are paid from the plan,
and the employer remains responsible until a
member’s death to make good any funding
shortfalls. Unless a participating employer chooses
to provide it, this guarantee would not be available
in a self-funded pension plan, so members will need
retirement income choices that provide for a desired
level of benefit security. Fortunately, a number of
options are available. Members who want a high
level of benefit security can purchase annuities or
invest their pension savings in low-risk bonds.
Members willing to accept investment risk in
exchange for the possibility of higher investment
returns can invest some or all of their pension
savings in the capital markets. 
Another option would be to revive tax rules per-
mitting “self-annuitizing” pension plans – DC plans
in which members receive guaranteed annuity
payments from a pool of assets held separately
within a pension plan for retirees. Operating under
grandfathering exceptions, a few large, self-annu-
itizing DC pension plans in Canada provide stable,
secure retirement incomes to members at reasonable
annuity purchase rates.
28 Still another option would
be to modify tax and pension standards rules to
permit term-certain annuities, with payment
periods to be determined by reference to standard
mortality tables. 
Unfortunately, it is not possible under Canada’s
current tax regime to establish flexible, self-funded
pension arrangements of the kind described above.
V. Reforming Pillar 3
In this part, we propose a number of legislative and
regulatory reforms that will give every Canadian
worker the opportunity to save enough for
retirement. 
Making MSPPs Work for All Canadians
When it comes to pension plans, big is good and
bigger is better. Biggest may well be best. As
Canadian experience in the public sector demon-
strates, MSPPs are vastly superior to single-
sponsor pension plans and RRSPs because they
can deliver good pensions with extremely low
unit administration costs. Pension standards laws
requiring pension plans to be registered and
administered by an employer, or by a board of
trustees with member representation in the case
of an MSPP, are unduly restrictive. To facilitate
the establishment of MSPPs, pension standards
legislation must be amended to expand the classes
of entities which may register and administer
pension plans. More specifically, rules governing
pension administration should facilitate the
establishment of pension plans governed by the
following kinds of administrators: 
￿ Associations of skilled trades;
￿ Professional associations;
￿ Associations of employers;
￿ Financial institutions and other private sector
service providers.
Rules requiring MSPP administrators to have
member representation should be changed to
make such representation an optional governance
feature. Pension standards legislation must be
amended to allow greater contractual flexibility to
allocate fiduciary and governance risks associated
with administering MSPPs; with clear guidelines
as to how service providers may be selected.
A Pension Plan: Job or No Job
The Income Tax Regulations state that a pension
plan’s “primary purpose” must be “to provide
periodic payments to individuals after retirement
and until death in respect of their service as
employees.”  These rules must be amended to
permit individuals to contribute from their
employment compensation to any pension
arrangement, whether linked to an employer 
or not, and to permit employers to contribute 
on behalf of their employees to any pension
plans(s) in which their employees may par-
ticipate. This would facilitate pooled pension
28 Prior to 1992, Revenue Canada’s administrative rules for pension plan registration permitted annuities to be paid from any pension plan. (See para-
graph 9(b) of Canada Revenue Agency, 1988.) Pension Reform prohibited annuitization within a DC pension plan because an annuity was considered
to be a DB benefit. See “Self-Annuitized Money Purchase Pension Plans” at http://www.cra-arc.gc.ca/tx/rgstrd/cnslttns/rpp_cq02-eng.html#q4. Commentary 275 | 21
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arrangements by making it unnecessary for
employers to sponsor pension plans individually,
allowing small and medium-sized businesses who
cannot afford the administrative expense of estab-
lishing a pension plan to offer pension plan
participation to their employees.
Everyone needs to save for retirement, so there is
no good reason why some kinds of taxable income
should be eligible for deferral in a pension plan only,
an RRSP only, or neither. Irrespective of source, all
taxable income should be eligible for pension
saving. At a minimum, the Income Tax Act must
therefore be amended to permit pension contri-
butions to be made from the broader “earned
income,” based upon which RRSP contributions
may now be made.
29This will make it possible –
and practical – for associations of self-employed
trades and professionals to sponsor pooled pension
arrangements by allowing their members to con-
tribute from their taxable income, even though they
may not receive employment income. 
Contributions and Benefits: 
Getting Out of the Straitjacket 
Pension standards and tax legislation rules requiring
similar benefits to be provided to all members of a
particular “class” of employees must be eliminated.
This will facilitate individual participation in
MSPPs on a self-funded basis, with or without
employer participation. In employer-sponsored
pension plans, it will allow workers greater flexibility
to choose how much compensation they want to
allocate to pension saving.
Tax and pension standards rules that require
employers to fund at least 50 percent of the cost of
DB pensions must be eliminated so that individuals
can fund their own DB pensions if they so choose.
Similarly, rules requiring apportionment of DB
assets and liabilities among participating employers
must be changed to allow assets and liabilities in a
DB plan to be tracked on a member-by-member
basis. In combination with de-linking pension
saving from a particular employer, this will allow
individuals who are not fortunate enough to belong
to an employer-sponsored DB pension plan to join
an MSPP that provides benefits similar to those
available from a public sector DB plan. 
The key difference between such a plan and
current public sector plans would be that benefits
would be self-funded with assets and liabilities
allocated individually to members. With the ability
to fund their own pensions, Canadian workers’
equity of access to income-deferred pension saving
will be dramatically enhanced: Those without
employer sponsored pensions will finally be able to
achieve a target retirement income through “catch-
up” funding – a tax benefit routinely enjoyed by
members of DB plans sponsored by employers
willing to pay the piper, but currently unavailable to
workers who are not so lucky.
Funding to a Target: 
Have You Saved Your Million Yet? 
The goal of pension saving should be a target
retirement income; the timing for funding to the
target should be flexible. Policymakers in the United
Kingdom realized this and as part of a “pensions
simplification” initiative in 2006, replaced annual
contribution limits with a lifetime deferral
allowance of £1.5 million with annual increases
approximating an inflationary measure. At an
annuity factor of 15, the 2008 allowance of £1.65
million translates into a lifetime retirement income
of £110,000. No longer restricted by annual con-
tribution limits, UK taxpayers can now obtain tax
relief on up to 100 percent of salary contributed to a
pension scheme, until the lifetime deferral allowance
is attained. This provides equal access to income
deferral to all taxpayers, and it allows for catch-up
funding for individuals who delay retirement saving
until later in their careers. 
Canadian tax rules purport to offer equal access
to deferred-income retirement saving. We have 
seen that in practice, they do not. To ensure all
Canadians have equal and equitable access to
retirement saving room, Canada should adopt a
target approach to retirement saving, with the target
expressed as a lump-sum contribution limit, a
lump-sum deferral, or a target retirement income. 
29 As provided in subsection 146(1) of the ITA, “earned income” includes income from an office or employment, active business income, rental
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A LUMP-SUM CONTRIBUTION LIMIT: In this scenario,
all Canadians get the same lifetime contribution
limit (e.g., $1,000,000). Using current PA and
RRSP reporting procedures, DC/RRSP contri-
butions and the normal cost of DB accrual would
be reported annually to the Canada Revenue
Agency (CRA), reducing contribution room. 
Year-end contribution room balances would be
increased in step with the rise in Average Industrial
Wage (AIW). Contributions exceeding the limit
would be subject to a penalty tax. 
A LUMP-SUM ACCUMULATION LIMIT: This the UK
approach: Every Canadian could participate in any
pension arrangement until the value of all deferred
income reaches a lump-sum, indexed amount (e.g.,
$1,000,000). Individual accumulation balances
would be reported annually to the CRA. Penalty tax
would apply to amounts exceeding the accu-
mulation limit.
ATARGET INCOME: Analogous to a lump-sum
deferral limit, maximum retirement saving room
would be expressed as target retirement income
(e.g,. $120,000) payable for life at a particular age
(e.g., 62) with standardized assumptions as to the
form in which the pension amount is paid (i.e.,
indexing, spousal survivor benefits, guarantee
period). The lump-sum value of the target income
could be accessed to provide a retirement income at
any age, reduced or increased so that benefits
received earlier or later than the target age are actu-
arially equivalent. Target income and deferral limit
approaches could be adopted in tandem, if
accompanied by technical provisions in the Income
Tax Regulations to establish an annually updated
prescribed basis for converting a target income limit
to a deferral limit, and vice versa, based on actuarial
standards.
With any of the target approaches, no annual con-
tribution limits would apply. Individuals could
contribute and deduct 100 percent of taxable income
earned in a year, though few will do so because of
consumption needs and tax considerations. 
The Limit: Accumulation or Contribution?
A curious anomaly of Canada’s pension tax rules is
that while many Canadians don’t have enough
retirement saving room, a few others appear to have
tax-sheltered large fortunes in their RRSPs
amounting to tens or even hundreds of millions of
dollars (Daw 2008) – arguably more than required
to provide adequate retirement income. This argues
in favour of an accumulation limit, which would
deliver equal, equitable access to retirement saving
room. By comparison, a lump-sum contribution
limit would permit high-income Canadians to tax-
shelter considerably more income by contributing
early so that investment returns compound over
longer periods. To ensure all Canadians will have
sufficient retirement savings room while preventing
excessive tax sheltering, a target accumulation limit,
representing the value of all deferred income, is
preferable to a target contribution limit. 
Finding the Target
If a target accumulation limit is adopted, what
should the limit be? This is of course a policy
decision. A limit of $1 million is suggested above
for discussion purposes, but is it reasonable?
Perhaps a good reference point would be the value
of pension benefits payable at various salary ranges
to a public sector employee who retires at the
median public sector retirement age (58) after a 
30-year career. Table 8 shows these values. Table 9
shows median retirement savings for Canadian
families in 2005 (Statistics Canada 2008).
Tables 8 and 9 offer some insights: 
1. Good pensions cost a lot of money.
2. The value of a public sector pension dwarfs the
retirement savings of private sector workers. 
A target accumulation limit between $900,000 and
$1.6 million appears reasonable, given that public
sector workers routinely accumulate pension and
RRSP savings within this range. Table 8 shows only
the value of deferred public sector pension savings.
Calculated according to Canada Revenue Agency
guidelines, a Pension Adjustment for a member of a
public sector pension plan leaves the member with
significant annual RRSP contribution room
(Canada Revenue Agency 2004). To get a rough
idea of the total income-deferral opportunity
available to a public sector worker, let’s say theCommentary 275 | 23
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$30,000 $11,700 $13,269 $320,925.72 $360,021.05 $2,490
$40,000 $15,600 $15,748 $415,602.70 $467,344.51 $3,480
$50,000 $21,293 $16,110 $533,227.02 $602,785.70 $3,429
$60,000 $27,293 $16,110 $654,774.42 $743,033.90 $3,429
$70,000 $33,293 $16,110 $776,321.82 $883,282.10 $3,429
$80,000 $39,293 $16,110 $897,869.22 $1,023,530.30 $3,429
$90,000 $45,293 $16,110 $1,019,416.62 $1,163,778.50 $3,429
$100,000 $51,293 $16,110 $1,140,964.02 $1,304,026.70 $3,429
$110,000 $57,293 $16,110 $1,262,511.42 $1,444,274.90 $3,429
$120,000 $63,293 $16,110 $1,384,058.82 $1,584,523.10 $3,429
Table 8: Value of Tax-Deferred Income – Public Sector Pension Plan
Note:   Retirement at age 58 with 30 years of service. Pension is 1.3% < YMPE; 2% > YMPE. Maximum permissible bridge. All benefits indexed
at 2.5. 60% J&S form of life pension with 5-year guarantee. CIAannuity purchase basis as at January 2008. Commuted values (shown
for comparison purposes) are lower than annuity purchase values because the commuted value calculation basis assumes a higher rate
of return on invested assets. The annuity purchase values show the estimated cost of buying the promised life and bridge pensions
from an insurance company. For a public-sector pension benefit promise, this is probably the most accurate measure of value because











Age (Major Income Recipient) Median Retirement Savings (Pension Plan and RRSP)
a
25 – 44 $29,800
45 – 54 $137,800
55 – 64 $244,800
65 – 69 $215,600
Table 9: Retirement Savings of Canadian Families.
a. The median includes public sector workers.
Source: Statistics Canada, “Perspectives on Labour and Income,” February 2008.| 24 Commentary 275
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worker contributes $3,000 every year to an RRSP
and gets a 7 percent return. After 30 years, the
RRSP will be worth about $300,000. Of course,
not everyone who can contribute to an RRSP will.
But for a public sector worker who does, the total
value of tax-deferred retirement savings accumulated
over a 30-year career can approach $2,000,000 – a
number that may surprise some people. 
A target, lifetime accumulation limit has a number
of advantages over  the Factor of 9 and the current
system of annual limits on retirement saving:
EQUITY: Current tax rules generally provide 
much greater opportunity for income deferral to
members of DB pension plans providing good
ancillary benefits than to DC/RRSP savers. 
A target approach will give all Canadians the 
same saving room.
FLEXIBILITY: Canadians could save for retirement
when they can. The likely result? More people will
save, more.
COMPREHENSIBILITY: Current pension tax rules are
incomprehensible to most Canadians.
30 Easy to
communicate, a target funding approach will allow
Canadians to compare their states of retirement
saving to a simple benchmark.
SIMPLICITY: A target funding approach will con-
siderably simplify pension tax regulation by
eliminating unnecessarily complex rules governing
the accrual, amount, form and timing of benefit
payments – rules that are the source of considerable
inequity of access and increase the cost of pension
administration. 
PRODUCTIVITY: Pension plans that provide bridging
benefits and subsidized early retirement encourage
workers who may still be productive to retire early
because if they don’t, they lose the early-retirement
benefits and effectively end up working for a partial
salary.
31 A target approach to retirement saving
would make the retirement choices of older workers
more neutral by allowing them to receive the value
of early-retirement benefits as larger pension
benefits if they decide to retire later. 
Finding the Target: A Middle Way
A target approach would represent a significant
departure from current rules and for this reason,
policymakers may hesitate to adopt it. However,
there are some more incremental approaches that
can, individually or in combination, improve 
equity of access to retirement income saving:
RESTORE LOST RRSP CONTRIBUTION ROOM:
Canadians who make in-career RRSP withdrawals
often do so because of financial hardship, making it
difficult or impossible to save enough for retirement
later. Introduced in the 2008 federal budget, the
new Tax Free Savings Account (TFSA) is func-
tionally equivalent to RRSP in terms of tax effects.
TFSA contribution room will be restored when
withdrawals are made. It would be sensible to
extend the same treatment to RRSPs. 
PROVIDE RRSP INFLATION PROTECTION: Individuals
who delay making RRSP contributions forgo sig-
nificant investment income deferral enjoyed by
those who contribute early. Inflation erodes the
value of unused room, further reducing the ability
to save enough in late career. Since RRSP and DB
accrual limits are indexed to the AIW, unused RRSP
room should also be indexed.
ELIMINATETHE 18-PERCENT LIMIT: By preventing
individuals from saving more than a fixed per-
centage of income determined annually, the
18-percent limit makes retirement saving more
difficult for those with fluctuating income or who
30 For a recent (and somewhat extreme) example of the complexity of pension tax rules, see the CRA’s June 2008 publication “Actuarial Increase
on Delayed Retirement” at http://www.cra-arc.gc.ca/tx/rgstrd/blltn/ctrlblltn01-eng.html. 
31 If a pension plan member earning $50,000 annually vests in a $30,000 pension and continues working, he or she will effectively be working
for $20,000/year. As discussed in a previous paper of this series, early retirement subsidies in defined-benefit pension plans make it difficult to
retain workers who may still be productive because additional years of pension accrual will not fully compensate them for the pension benefits
they do not collect if they continue working. As such, early-retirement incentives may have a significant and negative impact on the labour
supply as Canada’s population ages (Schirle 2008). Commentary 275 | 25
C.D. Howe Institute
leave the workforce temporarily to retrain, or as a
result of job loss or disability. The 18-percent limit
should be eliminated in favour of a flat dollar limit
to make it easier for Canadians with fluctuating
incomes to save enough for retirement.
REPLACETHE FACTOR OF 9: The Factor of 9 prevents
individuals who don’t belong to generous DB
pension plans from accumulating the same pensions
as those who do. It should be replaced with new
rules providing that the value of pension accrual in a
DB plan must be determined using factors
determined in accordance with actuarial standards,
which will more closely reflect the actual value of
participation in a DB pension plan. It should be
noted that if current rates of pension income accu-
mulation now permitted in DB pension plans are to
be maintained, this change would require a sub-
stantial increase in DC/RRSP contribution limits.
32
Whosoever Pays Shall Also Deduct
Employers may deduct pension administration
expenses, but not individuals. This discrepancy
needs to be addressed, either to prohibit deduction
of any administration expenses or to allow
deductions for whoever pays them. The latter is the
preferred approach, because it will increase effective
retirement saving room and create demand for
investment managers to disclose expenses, perhaps
resulting in greater scrutiny of the quantum of
expenses when individuals claim deductions on
their tax returns.
VI. The Day After 
What would life be like for Canadians if the reforms
this paper proposes are implemented?  For most
public sector workers, not much would change.
Even if a lump-sum accumulation limit is set below
the lump-sum values of pensions now paid out,
many public sector workers affected by limits under
tax rules are already provided supplementary
pension benefits in excess of those that can be
provided by a registered pension plan. 
For private sector workers, a lot will change when
a uniform target deferral limit is adopted, pension
saving is de-linked from employment and self-
employment income can be contributed to a
pension plan:
￿ Employed and self-employed workers without
pension plans will be able to join MSPPs
established by associations and private sector
service providers and gain access to high-quality
investment management services at a lower cost.
￿ All workers will have the retirement savings
room they need – whether they are born 
in Canada or not, whether they work in the
pubic or private sector and whether they 
save in MSPPs, in traditional pension plans, 
or in RRSPs.
￿ Small to mid-size employers will join MSPPs as
sponsoring employers, resulting in increased
pension plan coverage for private sector workers.
￿ More employers will establish flexible pension
arrangements that allow employers and
employees to contribute toward target
retirement benefits and allow for customized
risk-sharing arrangements. 
￿ New types of pension plan designs will become
available to employers (e.g., cash balance
pension plans).
￿ Workers who do not have an employer-
sponsored pension plan or who don’t join an
MSPP will have enough RRSP saving room to
provide for their own retirements.
￿ Workers who haven’t saved for retirement 
in early career will have the opportunity to 
catch up. 
￿ Members of DB pension plans who vest in
early-retirement subsidies will have a greater
incentive to continue working while they are
still productive. 
￿ Pension plan regulatory compliance and admin-
istration will be considerably simplified.
￿ Canadians will understand how their private
retirement saving works. 
32 To allow the 58-year-old public sector worker in Table 8 earning $120,000 to accrue a year of pension service, the 2008 DC contribution limit
would need to be $52,817 – two-and-a-half-times more than the actual 2008 DC contribution limit of $21,000 – if the Factor of 9 were
replaced by annuity purchase factors. See http://www.cra-arc.gc.ca/tx/rgstrd/resp-reee/papspapar-fefespfer/lmts-eng.html. | 26 Commentary 275
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Conclusion
Many Canadians have not saved enough for
retirement. One study suggests that about one-third
of Canadian families aged 45 to 64 have insufficient
savings to replace two-thirds of pre-retirement
earnings (Statistics Canada 2001). Despite the diffi-
culties of identifying precisely the number of
Canadians who will retire with insufficient savings,
what is certain is that there are considerable dif-
ferences as to how well different classes of workers
are prepared for retirement. We can make some gen-
eralizations:
￿ Public sector workers are well prepared. 
￿ Private sector workers with pension coverage are
somewhat prepared.
￿ Private sector workers without pension coverage
are not well prepared. 
After an experiment lasting almost two decades, we
can also say that Pension Reform has proven per-
versely inequitable in that it prevents most private
sector workers from accumulating the pensions
enjoyed by their public sector counterparts. But the
solution is not to dismantle the successful public
sector pension model or reduce pensions of public
sector workers. Rather, let’s have regulatory change
so that something like the public sector model can
become practically available in the private sector.
This would give all Canadians the same opportunity
to prepare for retirement, with or without the
assistance of an employer. 
Two key hurdles need to be overcome to ensure
that Pillar 3 retirement savings vehicles can work as
they should: 
￿ Tax rules need to be reformed to equalize access
to tax-deferred retirement saving so that all
Canadian workers can save what they need to,
when they can. 
￿ Pension standards rules need to be made more
flexible to accommodate new, more flexible
pension plan designs and to promote multi-
sponsor pooled pension arrangements that
leverage the successful design features of public
sector, multi-employer pension plans. 
If policymakers commit to making these changes,
more Canadians really will have better pensions. Commentary 275 | 27
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